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Abstract 
Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased 
choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) 
occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the 
ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or 
emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. 
Participants selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from either 
a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1), or were given no choice 
versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the 
choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a ‘good’ flavour, half a ‘bad’ flavour. 
As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants 
tasted the ‘bad’ drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of 
counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes 
were positive participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and 
no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of 
the ECE and construction of choice architectures are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 According to economic rational choice theory, greater choice will deliver well-
being by increasing the likelihood that individuals satisfy personal preferences (Mas-
Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). Consequently, extensive choice has become a 
fundamental aspect of both consumer markets and public policy (Schwartz, 2000; 
Botti & Iyengar, 2006). Choice provision can be direct, e.g. letting patients choose 
hospitals (Fasolo, Reutskaja, Dixon & Boyce, 2010), or indirect by increasing income 
and thus access to options (Dolan & White, 2007). Crucially, psychological research 
has challenged the basic assumption that more choice leads to greater well-being. 
Building on work by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) a number of researchers have shown 
that while some choice is good, more choice can be detrimental to satisfaction, and 
may a) lower the utility experienced from consumption of the chosen good (Chernev 
2003a; 2003b; Greifeneder, Scheibehenne & Kleber, 2010), and b) dampen overall 
product demand (Shar & Wolford, 2007; Iyengar, Jiang & Huberman, 2004).  
This negative impact of increased choice has been variously referred to as the 
“the problem of too much choice” (Fasolo, McClelland & Todd, 2007), the “choice 
overload hypothesis” (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Mogilner, Rudnick & Iyengar, 2008), 
the “overchoice effect” (Gourville & Soman, 2005), the “tyranny of choice” (Schwartz, 
2000), the “too-much-choice effect” (Lenton, Fasolo & Todd, 2008; Scheibehenne, 
Greifeneder & Todd, 2009), or the excess-choice effect (Arunachalam, Henneberry, 
Lusk, & Norwood, 2009). Throughout this article we refer to this effect as the ‘Excess 
Choice Effect’, or ‘ECE’. This phrase is selected as it is relatively neutral, simply 
describing the effect being considered, whereas many of the other listed terms are 
comparatively more value laden.  
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Crucially, if widespread, this ECE may mean that policies aimed at increasing 
well-being via choice actually deliver the opposite of their objectives. However, the 
universality of the ECE has been challenged. A meta-analysis of 50 studies found no 
overall effect either way: more choice neither consistently increased nor decreased 
well-being (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder &Todd, 2010). Nevertheless, the large 
degree of variance in study outcomes led the authors to conclude that a theoretical 
explanation of when and why the ECE occurred was needed. The current paper 
attempts to address this by drawing on theories of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; Roese & Summerville, 2005). Previous research has established a 
causal link between the ECE and counterfactual thought. For example, in Hafner, 
White and Handley’s (2012) experiment, participants were found to be significantly 
more satisfied with a choice of creative drawing material if selected from a limited (6) 
rather than an extensive (22) selection, and this difference was found to be 
attributable to the increased level of post-decisional counterfactual thought 
associated with extensive choice. Similarly, Mogilner, Shiv and Iyengar (in press) 
found that participants who were presented with a sequential choice of options 
reported less satisfaction with their chosen outcome, and attributed this to 
counterfactual thinking and the imagination of potentially ‘better’ future alternatives.   
The current research aims to build upon this and further explore the 
boundaries of the relationship between extensive choice and counterfactual thought, 
using key findings established within the counterfactual literature. Specifically we 
argue that people may be more likely to experience decreased satisfaction following 
extensive choice when the outcome of that choice is negative, due to the predicted 
impact of outcome valence (negative versus positive) on the experience of 
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counterfactual thought and emotion. The specific rationale for this is presented 
below, following an introduction to the topic of counterfactual thinking. 
What is Counterfactual Thinking? 
 Counterfactuals have been defined as evaluative thoughts about imagined 
alternatives to past events (Epstude & Roese, 2008), epitomised by the phrase “what 
might have been” (Roese, 1997). Research into counterfactual thinking has found 
that people create counterfactual alternatives to reality by mentally un-doing certain 
facts in their mental representation of reality (Byrne, 2005). Indeed, according to 
Roese and Olson (1995), in order to generate a counterfactual thought one typically 
starts with some factual outcome as the point of departure for the counterfactual 
supposition, and then alters (or mutates) some factual antecedent, whilst 
simultaneously assessing the possible consequences of that alteration. These 
counterfactual thoughts usually move in a direction that brings simulated 
occurrences closer to default expectations about how the world works. As Roese 
and Olson (1995) state, ‘counterfactuals recapitulate expectations’ (pp. 28). 
According to McEleney and Byrne (2006), this tendency to compare states of reality 
with ‘what might have been’ is a universal characteristic of human thought, which 
has been documented to occur from early childhood (Harris, 2000), and across 
cultures (see, for example, Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & Nishina, 2003) 
Spontaneously generated counterfactuals tend to be upward (i.e. imagining 
how an outcome could have turned out better had one acted differently), suggesting 
an overall emphasis on improvement (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1995; 
Koehler & Harvey, 2004). Such counterfactuals are typically associated with the 
experience of a range of negative emotions including shame, guilt, disappointment 
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and regret (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995) which 
tend to reduce well-being (Niedenthal Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Roese, 1997).  
The generation of counterfactual alternatives relates directly to the ECE according to 
the counterfactual ‘opportunity principle’ (Roese & Summerville, 2005; Epstude & 
Roese, 2008), which asserts that in any given situation, the more choices there are 
the more opportunities are available and consequently the greater the number of 
counterfactual possibilities one may consider post-choice.  
Counterfactual thinking and valence 
Crucially, however, in several instances evidence has been found that 
counterfactuals may be cued more readily following negative than positive decision 
outcomes (Roese, 1997; Boninger, Gleicher & Strathman, 1994; Sanna & Turley, 
1996; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). For example, in Sanna and Turley’s (1996) experiment, 
participants were asked to read a vignette in which the protagonist, Pat (who either 
typically performed well or poorly in courses), had either passed or failed a recent 
exam. Participants were asked to retell the story into microphones, and the number 
of spontaneously generated counterfactuals was recorded (Study 1). The authors 
found that participants were significantly more likely to generate counterfactual 
thoughts where outcomes were negative, and in which prior expectations had been 
violated. This effect was replicated in a second study (Study 2), which examined the 
impact of outcome valence upon counterfactual generation following real-life exam 
performance. Specifically, as outcome valence increased (i.e. outcomes became 
more positive), the number of spontaneously generated counterfactuals decreased 
(see also Tsiros & Mittal, 2000).       
Other evidence for the effect of valence upon counterfactual generation is 
more indirect, stemming from the fact that a great deal of research on the relation 
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between counterfactual thought and emotion has used negative outcome scenarios. 
For example, Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Strathman, Richman and Sherman (1990), used 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) investment scenario, and only found evidence for 
an action effect when outcomes were negative. When outcomes were positive the 
experimental manipulations were found to have a reduced impact upon affective 
reactions, suggesting that counterfactual thoughts were more readily cued, and 
subsequently more influential in judgements pertaining to negative outcomes (see 
also, Landman, 1987; although cf. Roese & Olson, 1993). 
Explanations for the Role of Valence in Eliciting Counterfactual Generation 
There are a number of potential explanations as to why counterfactuals may 
be less readily cued following positive than negative outcomes. For example, 
negative outcomes tend to promote exploration more so than positive outcomes 
(Wong, 1979), and may be remembered better than positive outcomes (Gilovich, 
1983). In addition, Wong and Weiner (1981) found that negative outcomes elicit 
greater attributional search than positive outcomes, which in contrast are typically 
not subject to the same degree of scrutiny. This difference in the depth of processing 
following positive and negative outcomes may result from the fact that people are 
motivated to learn how to avoid negative events in the future, and yet are rarely 
motivated to ‘un-do’ positive events (Wells, Taylor & Turtle, 1987). Indeed, it is 
widely accepted that a basic function of counterfactual thought may be to provide 
motivation and guide future behaviour (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1995; 
Zeelenberg, 1999). Subsequently in the face of a negative outcome, a person is 
likely to naturally generate counterfactual thoughts with greater frequency than 
following a positive outcome, due to an underlying motivation to improve their 
behaviour, and avoid similar negative outcomes in the future.  
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Subsequently, following what we know about the impact of valence upon 
counterfactual generation, and the link established between extensive choice and 
counterfactual thought (Hafner et al., 2012; Mogilner et al., in press), it was predicted 
that the number of options would be relatively unimportant for satisfaction with the 
chosen option if an individual experienced a positive outcome since they would be 
less likely to generate counterfactuals whether presented with few or many options. 
By contrast, for choices resulting in negative outcomes the number of options will be 
important because a) people will be more inclined to consider the alternatives 
foregone and b) the more alternatives foregone the more likely it will be perceived 
that one of those would have been a better choice. 
 Our ideas build on work by Botti and Iyengar (2004) who found that when 
faced with negative options, no choice is preferable to any choice. However, 
participants in that research were aware of the valence of their potential choice 
outcomes pre-choice (i.e. between appealing or unappealing ice-cream flavours), 
and the role of counterfactual thinking was not explored. In the current experiment 
participants experience either 'good' or 'bad' outcomes and were unaware of the 
outcome prior to sampling, making the task more similar to most consumer 
decisions. Further, participants were either asked about the reasons why they were 
(un)satisfied with their choice enabling us to monitor counterfactual thought 
(Experiment 1), or to provide a measure of perceived regret with choice in order to 
provide an emotional indicator of counterfactual experience (Experiment 2). 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 participants chose a drink to sample for a taste test from a 
limited (6) or an extensive (24) selection of options. In fact the choice was illusory as 
half the participants tasted exactly the same 'good' flavour and the other half a 'bad' 
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flavour. It was predicted that in the ‘bad’ outcome conditions there would be an ECE 
and this would be mediated by increased counterfactual thinking. Where outcomes 
were ‘good’ it was predicted that there would be no differences in counterfactual 
thinking as a function of choice set size and subsequently no ECE.   
Method 
Participants 
96 participants (59 women and 37 men, mean age = 31, with a range of 19 to 
67 years) from the Plymouth public took part in the experiment in exchange for £4 
payment. 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (choice level: limited vs. extensive) X 2 (outcome 
valence: ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’) between subjects design with participants randomly 
allocated to one of the four conditions.  
Materials 
Based on pre-testing of pre-existing flavoured waters (e.g. strawberry, peach), 
and other colourless flavoured waters created by adding food flavourings to tap 
water (e.g. rum flavouring, star anise) we selected a relatively ‘good’ drink flavour 
(blackcurrant) and a relatively ‘bad’ one (peppermint). By then adding food 
colourants to these flavours we created two identically looking choice sets of 24 
different coloured drinks: a 'good' set which all tasted of blackcurrant and a 'bad' set 
which all tasted of peppermint. Drinks were presented in clear plastic bottles labelled 
either A to F or A to X depending on choice condition.  
Procedure  
Participants were informed they were taking part in an experiment on taste 
perception and were presented with a selection of either 6 (limited choice) or 24 
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(extensive choice) drinks which they were informed were a variety of different 
flavours. Participants were instructed to choose the drink they “most liked the look of” 
and “would most like to sample”. After making their choice participants poured some 
of their chosen drink into a cup and sampled it before completing a three item 
satisfaction questionnaire (adapted from Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). The items were: 
“The drink I sampled was tasty”, “I was not satisfied with the drink I sampled 
(reversed)”, “I am happy I made the right choice from the selection available”. Each 
item called for ratings on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Internal consistency among the satisfaction items 
was high (α =.90) so they were collapsed to form a single satisfaction measure. After 
each item participants were asked to give “at least two reasons why you responded 
in that particular way”. 
Measuring counterfactual thinking 
The responses to the open ended questions were coded and used as a 
measure of spontaneously occurring counterfactual thought (e.g. White & Lehman, 
2005). Based on the coding framework developed by Hafner et al., (2012) for a 
similar task, statements were coded into five categories. 'Choice counterfactuals' 
involved the explicit comparison of the chosen option with foregone alternative(s), for 
example: “One of the other drinks may have tasted better”. ‘Positive drink appraisals’ 
involved positive descriptions of the chosen drink, e.g.: “Tasty and refreshing”. 
‘Negative drink appraisals’ involved negative descriptions of the chosen drink, e.g.: 
“Too sickly”. ‘Positive Comparisons’ involved a positive comparison between the 
chosen option and other options, e.g.: “Some of the other drinks look a bit weird”. 
Finally ‘Other Responses’ included any response which did not fit into any of the five 
main categories, e.g.: “More of a smell than a taste”. The first 25% of responses (134 
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statements) were double coded by two independent judges, and high levels of 
agreement were observed: Kappa = .88, p<.001. As inter-rater reliability was 
established, all 100% of responses as coded by the first judge were used for further 
analysis. Since we were primarily interested in the degree to which people 
considered other options, our key measure of counterfactual thinking was the overall 
proportion of thoughts that were 'choice counterfactuals' (i.e. 106 of 537 total 
statements, 19.74%).  
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
 Our manipulation of valence was successful. Participants were more satisfied 
if they tasted the 'good' than 'bad' drink (Ms= 4.90 vs. 2.99, t(94) = 5.79, p<.001). As 
predicted participants also generated a higher proportion of counterfactuals after 
tasting a 'bad' than 'good' drink (Ms= .26 vs. .15, t(94) = 2.48, p=.02).  
Choice level and counterfactuals for ‘bad’ outcomes 
To investigate the existence of the ECE effect for negative outcomes and the 
role of counterfactuals we conducted a three step mediation model. Following Baron 
and Kenny (1986) we regressed: 1) choice level (limited vs. extensive) on 
satisfaction, 2) choice level on counterfactuals, and 3) both choice level and 
counterfactuals onto satisfaction. The results are summarised in the upper half of 
Figure 1 with the results from Step 1 shown in brackets and those from Step 3 in 
italics. Step 1 replicated the ECE with greater satisfaction in the limited vs. extensive 
choice condition (Ms = 3.49 vs. 2.46; β = -.31, p = .04). Step 2 found that 
counterfactuals were marginally less likely to be generated following limited vs. 
extensive choice (Ms = 1.13 vs. 1.74; β = .26, p = .08). Step 3 suggests that the 
number of counterfactuals generated negatively affected satisfaction irrespective of 
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condition (β = -.47, p = .001). More importantly the main effect of choice level was no 
longer significant (β = -.18) once counterfactuals were added to the model. A Sobel 
test confirmed that counterfactuals were mediating the effect of choice on 
satisfaction (z = 1.60, p = .05, one tailed).  
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
Choice level and counterfactuals for ‘good’ outcomes 
The same approach to analysing the effect of choice and counterfactuals on 
satisfaction was used to investigate positive outcomes. Supporting predictions there 
was no main effect of choice level on either satisfaction or counterfactual thinking 
and no evidence of mediation (lower half of Figure 1). Participants were just as 
satisfied if they had chosen a pleasant drink following limited vs. extensive choice 
(Ms = 5.19; 4.63; β = -.18, p = .21) and generated just as many counterfactuals in 
the limited and extensive choice conditions (Ms= .88 vs. .72, β = -.18, p = .21). 
Again, demonstrating the importance of counterfactual thinking in general for 
satisfaction there was a strong negative relationship between them (β = -.40, p = 
.004) but crucially in this case they did not mediate the effect of choice (z = .49, p= 
.31, one tailed). 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was designed to explore whether the results of Experiment 1 
would replicate in an alternative choice task within the domain of consumer choice, 
this time involving chocolate choice. This experiment was also specifically designed 
to build upon research by Botti and Iyengar (2004) – in order to explore a) the role of 
valence on choice preferences (choice vs. no choice) using an extensive choice 
decision scenario (in contrast to the limited choice scenario’s used in that research), 
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and b) to explicitly explore the mediating role of regret in driving the preference for 
no choice where outcomes are negative.  
 In order to replicate the procedure used by Botti and Iyengar (2004) as closely 
as possible, in this experiment participants were either presented with an extensive 
choice of 24 options, or were given no choice, and simply given one option to 
sample. In this manner we then hoped to focus upon the impact of extensive choice 
on satisfaction, as this is the primary purpose of most research into the ECE, and to 
further explore the role of valence and counterfactual experience in determining 
people’s preferences for extensive choice versus no choice.  
 As this experiment was designed to compare the impact of extensive versus 
no choice on outcome satisfaction, it was not possible to assess counterfactual 
thought using the same process as Experiment 1. This is because half of the 
participants in this experiment were not given a choice, and as such could not be 
asked to explain reasons behind their choices. As such, in this experiment, 
participants were asked to rate their satisfaction and to then rate their experience of 
regret after having sampled the chocolate. In this manner we aimed to provide a 
measure of counterfactual emotion, which is used as an indication of counterfactual 
experience following choice versus no choice. 
In sum, it was predicted that extensive choice would only be detrimental to 
chooser satisfaction levels where choice outcomes were negative, and that this 
effect would be driven by an increased tendency to experience the counterfactual 
emotion of regret. Accordingly, when the capacity to make an active choice is 
removed, and participants are simply given one chocolate to sample, then 
satisfaction with the same negative outcome should be increased, as this will remove 
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the capacity to experience counterfactual thought and emotion which typically follow 
choice.  
Method 
Participants  
92 Psychology undergraduates (67 women and 25 men, mean age = 23, with 
a range of 18 to 51 years) at Plymouth University took part in the experiment in 
exchange for course credit. 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (choice: no choice vs. extensive) X 2 (outcome 
valence: ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’) between subjects design with participants randomly 
allocated to one of the four conditions.  
Materials 
Based on pre-testing we selected a relatively ‘good’ chocolate flavour (milk 
chocolate praline) and a relatively ‘bad’ (Cointreau liqueur) chocolate flavour, which 
were used to create the extensive choice sets. Following the procedure used in 
Experiment 1 once again the choice was illusory: participants were informed that the 
chocolates contained a variety of different flavours including “some liqueur 
chocolates, some fruit flavoured chocolates, some truffles, some caramels, and other 
assorted flavours”. However in actual fact all of the chocolates presented were 
identical in flavour, allowing us to provide a thoroughly controlled examination of the 
effects of choice type (no choice versus extensive choice) upon chooser satisfaction 
levels (see also Mogilner et al., 2008). Chocolates were presented in individual 
paper cake cases, each without labels so as to remove any impact of prior 
expectations on perception of choice outcome. 
Procedure  
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Participants were informed they were taking part in an experiment on taste 
perception and were either presented with an extensive (24) selection of chocolates, 
or were simply given one ‘good’ or ‘bad’ chocolate to sample. Participants in the 
choice condition were instructed to choose the chocolate they “most liked the look of” 
and “would most like to sample”. Whilst participants in the no-choice condition were 
informed that the chocolate in front of them had “been selected for them to sample”, 
and were asked to eat that chocolate.  
After sampling their chocolate, participants were asked to rate their 
satisfaction with the (choice) outcome. Following the procedure used in Experiment 1 
this was done using three satisfaction items adapted from Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000). These were: “The chocolate I sampled was tasty”, “I was not satisfied with 
the chocolate I sampled (reversed)”, “I enjoyed the chocolate I sampled”. Each item 
called for ratings on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). In addition, participants were also asked to rate their experience of 
regret after having sampled their (chosen) chocolate. Following the procedure used 
by Iyengar and Lepper (2000) this was done by asking participants: “Do you regret 
eating the chocolate you sampled?” Again participants were required to answer 
using a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Preliminary analysis demonstrated that our manipulation of valence was 
successful. Participants were more satisfied if they tasted the 'good' than 'bad' 
chocolate (Ms = 5.92 vs. 4.15, t(90) = 5.53, p <.001). As predicted participants also 
reported experiencing greater levels of regret after tasting a 'bad' than 'good' 
chocolate (Ms = 2.88 vs. 1.54, t(90) = -3.66, p <.001). 
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Choice level and regret for ‘bad’ outcomes 
To investigate the impact of extensive vs. no choice for negative outcomes 
and the role of regret we conducted a three step mediation model. Again following 
Baron and Kenny (1986) we regressed: 1) choice (no choice vs. extensive) on 
satisfaction, 2) choice on regret, and 3) both choice and regret onto satisfaction. The 
results are summarised in the upper half of Figure 2 with the results from Step 1 
shown in brackets and those from Step 3 in italics.  
Step 1 replicated the detrimental impact of extensive choice, with greater 
reported satisfaction in the no choice vs. extensive choice condition (Ms = 4.73 vs. 
3.57; β = -.31, p = .05). Step 2 found that participants reported experiencing 
significantly less regret following no choice vs. extensive choice (Ms = 1.70 vs. 4.75; 
β = .52, p = .001). Step 3 suggests that expressed regret negatively affected 
satisfaction irrespective of condition (β = -.79, p < .001). More importantly the main 
effect of choice level was no longer significant (β = -.11) once regret was added to 
the model. A Sobel test confirmed that regret was mediating the effect of choice on 
satisfaction (z = 3.21, p < .001, one tailed). 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Choice level and regret for ‘good’ outcomes 
The same approach to analysing the effect of choice and regret on 
satisfaction was used to investigate positive outcomes. Supporting predictions there 
was no main effect of choice on either satisfaction or regret and no evidence of 
mediation (lower half of Figure 2). Participants were just as satisfied if they had 
chosen a pleasant chocolate following no choice vs. extensive choice (Ms = 5.81; 
6.03; β = .10, p = .50) and experienced similar levels of regret following no choice vs. 
extensive choice (Ms= 1.48 vs. 1.60, β = .05, p = .72). Again, demonstrating the 
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importance of regret in general for satisfaction there was a strong negative 
relationship between them (β = -.48, p < .001) but crucially in this case they did not 
mediate the effect of choice (z = .37, p = .36, one tailed). 
Discussion 
 In line with predictions across two experiments the current research found 
evidence that extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction following 
relatively 'bad' but not 'good' outcomes, and that this effect could be explained by the 
generation of more counterfactual thoughts or greater experience of counterfactual 
emotion following negative experiences and an extensive choice set. These findings 
demonstrate that thoughts about non-chosen options and the experience of 
counterfactual emotion contribute to the increased dissatisfaction observed under 
excess choice conditions. By demonstrating the importance of outcome valence we 
provide an important moderating condition for the ECE which may help explain the 
inconsistency of previous findings (cf. Scheibehenne et al., 2010). Each claim is now 
considered in turn.  
 Our evidence supporting the role of counterfactual thinking in the ECE follows 
directly from previous research. Hafner et al., (2012) demonstrated that under 
normal conditions people generate more counterfactual thoughts when having to 
choose from an extensive vs. limited choice set but that when the ability to generate 
such thoughts is attenuated via a cognitive load task, the ECE disappears. Similarly, 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000) demonstrated that people tend to report greater regret 
following extensive choice, and regret is one of several negative emotions 
associated with counterfactual thinking (Niedenthal, et al., 1994). The claim is also 
consistent with the theoretical arguments of Schwartz (2004) who argued that "as the 
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number of {options} goes up...opportunity costs, and associated counterfactual 
thoughts and smidgens of regret, mount higher and higher" (pp.156). 
Notably, Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman and Tormala (2011) recently introduced 
the concept of ‘counterfactual potency’ (CP), a construct involving the interaction 
between two components of counterfactual influence – 1) the perceived likelihood of 
the antecedent in the counterfactual, and 2) the perceived conditional likelihood of 
the alternative outcome. The authors argue that CP is ‘a key predictor of the degree 
and strength of the influence that a counterfactual thought will exert’ (pp. 31). Indeed, 
in a series of scenario-based experiments, the authors found evidence CP was 
predictive of participants’ experience of negative affect post-choice, as well as 
judgements of causation and responsibility.  
The results from the current research contribute to this literature – suggesting 
that an additional factor which influencing CP may be the number of options initially 
presented in the decision scenario. Specifically, the more options one is presented 
with, the more likely it is that one can imagine having picked a ‘better’ alternative. 
However, Petrocelli et al. (2011) suggest that it is CP, rather than counterfactual 
frequency, which is predictive of post-choice satisfaction and the experience of 
negative affect. The current research provides evidence contrary to this suggestion, 
finding that the frequency of counterfactual response was found to significantly 
mediate the impact of choice set size upon outcome satisfaction (Experiment 1).  
One potential explanation for this difference in findings may involve the 
manipulation of initial choice set size, which was not considered in Petrocelli et al.,’s 
(2011) research. Indeed, it may be the case that when an individual is faced with a 
choice involving a limited number of options, then CP, rather than counterfactual 
frequency, is the stronger predictor of outcome satisfaction, as one would not 
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necessarily expect the individual to generate a large quantity of counterfactual 
alternatives in a scenario in which only a small number of other potential outcomes 
are possible. Conversely, as choice level increases, the number of potential states of 
the world that did not actually occur (i.e. counterfactuals) also increases – potentially 
explaining why increased choice leads to demonstrable differences in the frequency 
of counterfactual generation: consistent with the counterfactual opportunity principle 
(see Roese & Summerville, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008).  
It would be interesting to continue to further explore the link between choice 
level, counterfactual frequency and counterfactual potency: one might predict that 
increasing choice level also leads to increased counterfactual potency, as well as 
counterfactual frequency – due to the fact that the greater the number of 
counterfactual alternatives one has to consider, the greater the likelihood that some 
of those would be easily imagined ‘better’ alternatives – contributing to the 
experience of negative affect and decreased satisfaction post-choice. 
 Further support for the role of valence within the ECE would be offered if a 
review of previous studies revealed that only those which were associated with 
relatively bad outcomes led to the effect. Unfortunately this is virtually impossible 
since we cannot know a priori which outcomes were positive or negative for the 
individuals making the decisions. In some instances where the ECE was found, such 
as having to write an essay (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000, Study 2) or demonstrate 
creativity or artistic talent (Hafner et al., 2012) we might infer that the experience was 
a relatively negative one for many participants, but we can't know this for sure. 
Similarly, several studies that seemed to have involved choices with a high chance 
of positive outcomes (e.g. chocolates, restaurants and music; Berger, Draganska & 
Simonson, 2007; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder & Todd, 2009) also failed to find an 
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ECE. Again, however, we can’t be sure how these outcomes compared to other 
choices participants could have made since outcome valence was not directly 
manipulated.   
 More challenging for our account are studies that demonstrate the ECE using 
apparently positive (e.g. jams, chocolates, Iyengar & Lepper, 2000, Studies 1 & 3) or 
neutral (e.g. pens; Shar & Wolford, 2007) stimuli. However, just as with studies that 
seem to support our approach we simply don’t know what the initial reactions of 
people were in these studies leaving open the possibility that they were relatively 
negative or at least more negative than researchers had expected. Thus we are 
unable to 'retro-fit' our approach to the previous literature because although we may 
have intuitive beliefs about whether a choice set is likely to contain options which 
people will find relatively positive or negative we are unable to determine this. A test 
of our explanation of the ECE will therefore depend on future studies which, like our 
own, deliberately manipulate the valence of experiences of choice.  
Our results highlight the importance of considering probable outcome valence 
when constructing choice architectures (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). If outcomes are 
likely to be positive people are less likely to consider options foregone and thus more 
choice may help them find a match for their preferences and enhance outcomes. 
However, if immediate outcomes are likely to be viscerally negative, more choice 
may undermine satisfaction. For instance, people tend to dislike parting with current 
earnings to invest in pensions (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) and thus presenting them 
with many options is likely to lead to more counterfactual thinking, and less 
satisfaction with any given choice. Perhaps this is one reason why people tend to 
invest more when provided with a default pension scheme that reduces the need to 
compare many options (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). We can imagine a similar process 
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occurring when people have to choose between a range of hospitals for an 
unpleasant medical operation (Fasolo et al., 2010), or between treatment methods 
following illness (Degner & Sloan, 1992). In such cases it may actually be better to 
provide a more limited number of options in order to reduce counterfactual thinking. 
However, it is of course important to note that the results of the current experiments 
involving choices of chocolates and drinks may not necessarily accurately generalise 
to more important real-life decision scenarios such as these, which may to some 
extent reflect a desire to rely on the expertise of a physician under circumstances 
with such potentially important consequences.  More research will therefore be 
needed using real-life decision scenarios with consequential outcomes, in order to 
establish whether this is the case. 
To conclude, the current research demonstrated that high levels of choice 
were only ‘too much’ when the person experienced a negative outcome because this 
increased the chance that they would think of options foregone. Given the potential 
implications for the choice agenda in consumer markets and public policy settings 
further research is needed to a) identify decision contexts likely to be associated with 
relatively ‘negative’ experiences, and b) determine the potential benefits to well-
being of reducing choice in these instances.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Mediation analysis showing the role of counterfactuals in mediating the 
effect of choice set size on satisfaction for ‘negative’ but not ‘positive’ outcomes. 
 
Figure 2. Mediation analysis showing the role of regret in mediating the effect of 
extensive choice vs. no choice on satisfaction for ‘negative’ but not ‘positive’ 
outcomes. 
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Satisfaction (‘Good’ Outcomes) (-.18 ns) / -.21ns 
 
Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model for ‘negative’ outcomes. The lower half (dashed arrows) = 
mediation model for ‘positive’ outcomes. Figures are standardised beta weights. ns = not significant, m = p = .08, *= p≤.05, 
**= p≤.01, ***= p≤.001. 
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Note. The upper half (solid arrows) = mediation model for ‘negative’ outcomes. The lower half (dashed arrows) = 
mediation model for ‘positive’ outcomes. Figures are standardised beta weights. ns = not significant, *= p≤.05, **= p≤.01, 
***= p≤.001. 
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